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Indian bank efficiency and productivity changes with undesirable outputs: 
A disaggregated approach 
 
 
Abstract: 
The objective of this study is to examine technical efficiency and productivity growth in the 
Indian banking sector over the period from 2004 to 2011. We apply an innovative 
methodological approach introduced by Chen et al. (2011) and Barros et al. (2012), who use a 
weighted Russell directional distance model (WRDDM) to measure technical inefficiency. 
We further modify and extend that model to measure TFP change with NPLs. We find that 
the inefficiency levels are significantly different among the three ownership structure of 
banks in India. Foreign banks have strong market competitiveness in India and they pull the 
production frontier in a more efficient direction. SPBs and domestic private banks show 
considerably higher inefficiency. We conclude that the restructuring policy applied in the late 
1990s and early 2000s by the Indian government has not had a long-lasting effect. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last two decades empirical research on Indian bank efficiency and productivity 
has attracted a considerable attention among academics and practitioners. Numerous studies 
have been published on bank performance that include, for example, Casu et al. (2012), Das 
and Ghosh (2006), Sensarma (2006, 2008), Das and Shanmugam (2004), Kumbhakar and 
Sarkar (2003), who among others examine bank efficiency and productivity growth of the 
Indian banking sector, mostly during the 1990s and early 2000s.  
Despite extensive and numerous research, we identify a gap in recent academic 
research on bank efficiency and productivity in India. In particular, there is a lack of recent 
empirical studies that analyze the changes within the Indian banking sector in the second half 
of the 2000s, i.e. after the liberalization and consolidation process. In addition, the Indian 
banking system faces the problem of deteriorating balance sheets because of the growing 
volume of non-performing loans (NPLs) and the direct impact of NPLs on bank performance 
has not yet been addressed in recent literature. We also try to provide a deeper and more 
profound analysis of how individual inputs and outputs affect bank efficiency and 
productivity. Such an analysis is important for policy-makers, since it can disclose the main 
shortcomings within the individual banks and the system as a whole. This important issue has 
been neglected in banking studies, see, for example, Barros et.al. (2012) and Assaf et. al. 
(2013). The analysis of NPLs helps to disclose and recognize the problems within the system 
that could lead to the implementation of an appropriate regulatory framework. These changes 
could restore sound and efficient functioning of the Indian banking sector.  
We examine technical efficiency and productivity growth in the Indian banking sector 
over the period from 2004 to2011. In doing so, we apply an innovative methodological 
approach introduced by Chen et al. (2011) and Barros et al. (2012), who use a weighted 
Russell directional distance model (WRDDM) to measure the technical inefficiency of Indian 
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banks. We further modify and extend the model by measuring also total factor productivity 
(TFP) change. The uniqueness and contribution of this approach lies in resolving technical 
difficulties involved in the empirical analysis of how to disaggregate and quantify the 
contribution that individual components (outputs/inputs) have on bank efficiency and TFP 
change. The model is based on directional distance function, which we estimate in linear 
form. This has the attractive advantage of easy computation and incorporates undesirable 
outputs into the model. 
 Thus, we disaggregate and quantify the impact not only of NPLs but all the individual 
inputs/outputs on bank efficiency and TFP change. This is a new element in studies on bank 
efficiency in general, and an important contribution to current research on Indian bank 
efficiency and productivity in particular. The attempt to examine bank efficiency and 
productivity growth in this way is reinforced by the rapidly increasing volume of NPLs on 
Indian bank balance sheets. Furthermore, contemporary research on bank productivity has 
focused so far on the decomposition of TFP into Technical Change (TECHCH) and 
Efficiency Change (EFFCH).  
 We summarize the contribution of this study as follows. First, we examine the nexus 
between NPLs and bank efficiency that allows us to quantify the impact of NPLs on bank 
efficiency. Secondly, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the effects of individual bank 
inputs/outputs on overall banking efficiency and productivity. The decomposition of total 
technical efficiency and TFP, TECHCH and EFFCH by taking into account the contribution 
of the individual inputs and outputs is a key contribution to current research on bank 
efficiency. Third, the empirical analysis is the first of its type applied to the Indian banking 
sector that examines bank efficiency and productivity changes after the extensive bank 
consolidation process in the 1990s and early 2000s. We examine the period from 2004 to 
2011. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of firm “innovator” (Fare et al. 1994) into our 
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analysis. We quantitatively identify the best practice that move the production frontier 
upward. The discussion about this concept is in Section 4. Finally, we outline the policy 
implications of our findings.  
 The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows: Section 2 provides an 
overview of the Indian banking industry, highlighting all the recent trends and challenges. 
Section 3 provides an overview of the literature, focusing on all the current gaps and 
reinforcing the contributions of this study. Section 4 describes the model and method of 
estimation. Section 5 discusses the data set and empirical results. Section 6 summarizes 
findings and concludes. 
 
2. Indian Banking System: An Overview 
The banking system in India has undergone complex transformation over last five decades. 
The sector experienced several conflicting development phases. In the 1950s, free and 
relatively liberal banking was gradually nationalised. This process was started by the 
transformation of the Imperial Bank of India into the State Bank of India (SBI). SBI’s main 
objective was gradually to take over additional private banks in order to introduce the 
imposed policy of administratively allocated credits into sectors like agriculture and small 
businesses. The banking sector has become severely repressed through strict entry controls, 
interest rate controls and reserve requirements, among others restrictions. Furthermore, the 
nationalization of the banking sector was extensive. Sixteen commercial banks were 
nationalised in 1969 and a further six in 1980.  
The banks that currently perform business activities in India can be divided into the 
following groups: public-sector banks, which include also private capital that is, however, 
rather marginal, purely privately-owned banks and banks with foreign capital. Along with 
these banks there are also regional rural banks and co-operatives. 
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 Administrative regulation of the Indian banks substantially reduced competitivene 
pressures. In terms of total assets, the market share of state-owned banks was more than 90 
per cent. Such a deformed market structure marginalized the activities of private and foreign 
commercial banks. The lack of market pressures and competition led to inefficient credit 
allocation by state-owned commercial banks. This was later reflected in the deterioration of 
bank balance sheets. Particularly, there has been an increase in the volume of NPLs, bank 
profitability dropped and consequently banks became undercapitalized.  
In the 1980s, it became evident that the over-regulated and inefficient Indian banking 
system was not able to respond to the fast growing economy. This fact was recognised by 
Narasimham Committee reports in 1991 and 1998, see Narasimham (1991, 1998). The 
Committee addressed the main shortcomings of the Indian banking sector and outlined 
banking reforms. The Indian banking sector has undergone several important phases of 
restructuring in last two decades.  
In the 1990s, the government recognised that structural, legal and institutional bank 
reforms were essential for further economic development. The Indian banking system has 
gradually been deregulated, opened to new domestic and foreign banks and formerly state-
owned banks were partially privatised, recapitalised and consolidated. The stability of the 
state-owned banks has been undermined by an increase in NPLs. These key reforms were 
aimed at the improvement of bank competitiveness, performance and anchoring stability 
within the banking system. The changes focused on the deregulation of the banking sector, 
particularly credit control allocation along with interest rate control on deposit and loans. The 
banking sector was also gradually opened-up to new entrants – both private and foreign banks. 
An integral part of this reform was the extensive recapitalization of state-owned banks. Herd 
et al. (2011) indicate that overall INR 204 billion was spent on banking consolidation during 
the 1990s, which corresponds to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2009. 
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The second stage of reforms reflected the recommendation of the second Narasinham 
Committee on Financial Sector Reforms in 1998. These changes were intended to restore the 
stability of the banking system through improved banking regulation, imposing the minimum 
standards on capital adequacy, increase competitiveness and efficiency. As a consequence of 
these measures, there has been a wave of mergers and acquisitions among banks. Some of 
these mergers and acquisitions were conducted on market principles but in many cases the 
government ‘assisted’ in this consolidation process.  
Herd et al. (2011) argue that the government has to continue the recapitalization of the 
banking sector and that between 18 and 20 PSBs will require further financial assistance. As 
for the privately-owned banks it is also expected that additional capital is needed to stabilize 
particularly small-sized private banks. Herd et al. (2011) further show that the government 
prepared the provision of INR 165 billion for the recapitalization of PSBs in the 2010–2011 
Budget. These resources are in addition to INR 31 billion spent in the period 2008–2009. 
Although the bulk of poor quality assets on the balance sheets has been written off, 
new NPLs have been accumulated. This problem was reinforced by the fact that the 
provisions against NPLs were only 46 per cent in 2010. The regulator responded to the low 
level of provision by increasing provisioning requirements to 70 per cent by the end of 2010. 
It is evident that the current level of NPLs could eventually lead to systemic risk in the sector, 
unless the government does not step in. It is evident that the balance sheets of SPB have again 
gradually deteriorated, particularly in terms of outstanding loans. 
 
3. Literature Review 
In the following Section, we provide a brief overview of empirical studies on the 
performance of Indian banks. The second part of the review summarizes and outlines the 
current development of methodological research in estimating efficiency and productivity in 
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general. And we show how our methodology contributes to the overall literature on bank 
efficiency and productivity measurements. 
 
3.1. Empirical research on Indian bank efficiency and productivity 
Since the second half of the 1990s, there has been extensive research that examines bank 
efficiency and productivity growth in Indian banking. Empirical research of the Indian 
banking sector can be divided into two main strands. First, studies that analyze bank 
efficiency and productivity changes, with particular attention on ownership structure. The 
second strand of literature examines the impact of consolidation, deregulation and 
restructuring processes on bank efficiency and productivity. 
 The first strand of empirical research is represented by Sarkar and Bhaumik (1998), 
Sarkaret et. al. (1998), Bhaumik and Dimova (2004), among others. These studies investigate 
whether the bank ownership structure had an effect on bank efficiency during and after the 
deregulation process that was initiated in the 1990s. In particular, they analyze how the 
different efficiency levels of state-owned banks differ from private domestic and foreign 
banks. They argue that there was no significant improvement in bank efficiency in the early 
stage of liberalization, i.e. from 1993 to 1995. Bhaumik and Dimova (2004) expand the 
period analyzed by covering the period from 1995 to 2001. Their results show that domestic 
private and foreign banks performed better in 1995–1996 and then after the degree of 
divergence narrows between these two groups of banks and state-public banks (SPBs).  
 Sahoo and Tone (2009) in their study analyze profit changes within the Indian 
banking sector. They find, among other important results, that all three types of banks 
showed a recovering efficiency change trend after 2002. They describe this as an indication 
of the positive effects of structural changes on Indian banks’ performance. Furthermore, they 
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argue that output and resource allocation performances are weak in the segment of 
nationalized banks. Tabak and Tecles (2010) deploy the Bayesian stochastic frontier 
approach to test both cost and profit efficiencies in the Indian banking sector during the 
period from 2000 to 2006. Their results are in line with other studies on bank efficiency, i.e. 
SPBs became more efficient compared to domestic private and foreign banks. They argue 
that these results favour the current liberalization policy that opens the Indian banking sector. 
Thus, the openness of the sector to newcomers leads to increased competition and 
consequently domestic banks are forced to adopt best practices. 
 Recently, Sanyl and Shankar (2011) use a sample of Indian banks that covers the 
period from 1992 to 2004. They split up the sample into the pre- and post-1998 period. The 
results indicate that the productivity gap among different groups of banks increased after 
1998. Surprisingly, the private domestic banks were the worst performers.  
The second strand of research represented, for example, by Bhattacharryya et al. 
(1997), who examine TFP changes within SPBs over the period from 1970 to1992. Such a 
relatively long period provides a detailed analysis of bank behaviour during the different 
phases of banking sector development. They argue that the institutional changes, such as 
economic liberalization and deregulation of the financial sector, positively affected TFP 
annual growth, which increased from 2 to 7 percent by the end of the analyzed period. 
Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) conduct a similar investigation for the period from 1985 to 
1996. They show that SPBs did not respond so positively to the deregulation process as 
private domestic and foreign banks.  
 Das and Kumbhakar (2012) contribute further to research on bank efficiency and 
productivity. Their study applies an innovative methodological concept by capturing the 
qualitative aspects of inputs/outputs in modelling bank efficiency and productivity. The study 
covers the period from 1996 to 2005. The results indicate that there was an improvement in 
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bank efficiency levels from 61 per cent to 72 per cent in 1996 and 2005 respectively. In 
addition, they show that the improvement in bank efficiency levels in the SPBs segment was 
higher compared to private banks. TFP growth was above 3.5 percent per annum over the 
examined period. The driving forces behind TFP growth were technical progress and 
technical efficiency.  
 The most recent study by Casu et al. (2013) examines the impact of regulatory reform 
on productivity growth and its components for Indian banks from 1992 to 2009. They argue 
that productivity growth is driven mainly by technological progress. In addition, their results 
indicate that different ownership types react differently to changes in the operating 
environment. The result unambiguously indicates that foreign banks become increasingly 
dominant and their production technology becomes the best practice in the industry in India.  
 
3.2. Bank performance with undesirable outputs: Methodological concepts 
Despite the fact that NPLs are important determinants affecting bank performance there have 
not been any studies that integrate or examine the role of NPLs on overall bank efficiency 
and performance.  
 Assaf et al. (2013) shows that NPLs have to be incorporated in the production process, 
otherwise the results are biased. For example, when a standard estimation of bank 
performance is considered, i.e. without including NPLs directly in the model, then a high 
performing bank is not necessarily better than other banks, as it might be doing that at the 
expense of producing a high percentage of undesirable outputs. Thus, a production process 
must be clearly defined based on both desirable and undesirable outputs; using only desirable 
outputs will fail to credit a bank for its effort to reduce undesirable outputs (Fernandez et al. 
2002). 
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 There has been an expansion in the range of methodological approaches to empirical 
research on performance measurement models with undesirable outputs. Most of these 
studies have been published in the field of environmental and energy research: Färe and 
Grosskopf (2010), Färe et al.(2005), Zhou et al. (2007), among others. Färe and Lovell (1978) 
argue that to measure technical efficiency relative to an isoquant rather than to an efficient 
subset can lead to the identification of a unit as being technically efficient when it is not. 
Even recent studies show that non-radial efficiency measures have a higher discriminating 
power in evaluating the efficiencies of DMUs, for example, Fukuyama and Weber (2009), 
Chen at al. (2011) and Barros et al. (2012), among others. 
 However, research studies that estimate bank performance do not include in their 
models undesirable output NPLs as a part of the production process. NPLs are considered as 
a control variable in the specified efficiency function see, for example, Mester (1996), Berger 
and Mester (1997) among others. Alternatively, NPLs measure management behaviour 
through bad luck or bad management hypotheses introduced by Berger and De Young (1997), 
Williams (2004). 
 In the seminal paper, Berg et al. (1992) incorporate the quality of bank assets directly 
into the model. They measure bank productivity in the Norwegian banking sector by applying 
the Malmquist index. The quality of loan evaluations is measured through loan losses that are 
used as an additional output in the model. This type of research has only recently been 
extended by Park and Weber (2006), who reopened the issue of NPLs and their inclusion in 
the production process. Park and Weber (2006) treat NPLs as an undesirable output for 
measuring bank efficiency and productivity of Korean banks for the period from 1992 to 
2002. NPLs are an undesirable by-product output arising from the production of loans. The 
methodological approach is based on the directional technology distance function and allows 
controls for loan losses that are an undesirable by-product arising from the production of 
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loans. Fukuyama and Weber (2008) then investigate efficiency and shadow prices for NPLs 
within Japanese commercial banks during the period from 2002 to 2004. They concluded that 
NPLs should not be ignored in the efficiency analysis of Japanese banks. Barros et al. (2012) 
show that the implementation of NPLs into the efficiency model provides bank managers and 
regulators with an additional dimension in their decision-making process since they affect 
bank efficiency. The most recent study by Assaf et al. (2013) confirms Barros et al’s (2012) 
results, showing that NPLs have to be integrated in the model.  
It is evident that the performance of Indian banks has been extensively analyzed from 
different perspectives. However, none of these studies accounts directly in their model for an 
undesirable output, i.e. NPLs. In addition, our study provides a unique analysis of the 
individual factors of the production process and the final outputs. Thus, we open a black-box 
by being able to distinguish the contribution of the individual production factors and final 
outputs. Finally, we use a dataset that enables us to examine the recent trend in the Indian 
banking sector. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
This study measures productivity change in the Indian banking sector. We apply the weighted 
Russell directional distance model (WRDDM) to measure productive inefficiency using 
production technology following Chen et al. (2011) and Barros et al. (2012). They proposed 
a measure based on directional distance function, which is evaluated in linear form, and 
hence possesses the attractive advantages of easy computation and easy extension of 
incorporating the additional undesirable outputs into the programming problems. Our main 
objective is to understand the impact of the changes of individual inputs/outputs on bank 
productivity. This is a novelty in contemporary research on bank efficiency and productivity.  
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4.1. Weighted Russell directional distance model (WRDDM) 
Let inputs be denoted by Nx R+ , good outputs by
MRy + , and undesirable outputs by 
LRb + . 
The directional distance function seeking to increase the desirable outputs and decrease the 
undesirable outputs and inputs directionally can be defined by the following: 
 
D⃗⃗ (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏|g) = sup{β: (𝑥 + 𝛽g, 𝑦 + 𝛽g, 𝑏 + 𝛽g) ∈ 𝑇}   (1) 
 
 Where the vector g = (−g𝑥, g𝑦, −g𝑏) determines the directions in which inputs, 
desirable outputsand undesirable outputs are scaled. The technology reference set T = {(x, 
y,b): x can produce (y, b)} satisfies strong disposability of desirable outputs and inputs, and 
weak disposability of undesirable outputs. 
 Suppose there are j = 1, 2,⋯ , k ,⋯ , Jfirms in the dataset. Each firm uses inputs 𝑥 =
(𝑥1, 𝑥2, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑁) ∈ 𝑅+
𝑁 to jointly produce desirable outputs 𝑦 = (𝑦1, 𝑦2, ⋯ , 𝑦𝑀) ∈ 𝑅+
𝑀  and 
undesirable outputs 𝑏 = (𝑏1, 𝑏2, ⋯ , 𝑏𝐿) ∈ 𝑅+
𝐿 . The WRDDM for inefficiency calculation of 
firmk can be described as follows: 
  
D⃗⃗ (x, y, b|g) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 (
1
𝑁
∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑘 +𝑁𝑛=1
1
𝑀
∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑘 +𝑀𝑚=1
1
𝐿
∑ 𝛽𝑙
𝑘𝐿
𝑙=1 )  (2) 
subject to 
∑ 𝑧𝑘𝑦𝑚𝑗 ≥ 𝑦𝑚𝑘 + 𝛽𝑚
𝑘 g𝑦𝑚𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1  (3) 
∑ 𝑧𝑘𝑏𝑙𝑗 = 𝑏𝑙𝑘 + 𝛽𝑙
𝑘g𝑏𝑙𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1  (4) 
∑ 𝑧𝑘𝑥𝑛𝑗 ≤ 𝑥𝑛𝑘 + 𝛽𝑛
𝑘g𝑥𝑛𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1  (5) 
𝑍𝑗 ≥ 0,   𝑗 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑘,⋯ , 𝐽 (6) 
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where β
𝑚
𝑘 , β
𝑙
𝑘, and β
𝑛
𝑘
 are the individual inefficiency measures for desirable outputs, 
undesirable outputs, and inputs, respectively. Zk is the intensity variable to shrink or expand 
the individual observed activities of firm k for the purpose of constructing convex 
combinations of the observed inputs and outputs. To estimate productivity change indicators, 
we set directional vectorg = (−g𝑥𝑛𝑘, g𝑦𝑚𝑘, −g𝑏𝑙𝑘) = (−𝑥𝑛𝑘, 𝑦𝑚𝑘, −𝑏𝑙𝑘);, the WRDDM is 
shown as follows: 
 
D⃗⃗ (𝑥𝑘, 𝑦𝑘, 𝑏𝑘|g) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 (
1
𝑁
∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑘 +𝑁𝑛=1
1
𝑀
∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑘 +𝑀𝑚=1
1
𝐿
∑ 𝛽𝑙
𝑘𝐿
𝑙=1 ) (7) 
subject to 
∑ 𝑧𝑘𝑦𝑚𝑗 ≥ 𝑦𝑚𝑘(1 + 𝛽𝑚
𝑘 )𝐽𝑗=1               (8) 
∑ 𝑧𝑘𝑏𝑙𝑗 = 𝑏𝑙𝑘(1 − 𝛽𝑙
𝑘)𝐽𝑗=1                (9) 
∑ 𝑧𝑘𝑥𝑛𝑗 ≤ 𝑥𝑛𝑘(1 − 𝛽𝑛
𝑘)𝐽𝑗=1               (10) 
𝑍𝑗 ≥ 0,   𝑗 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑘,⋯ , 𝐽              (11) 
 
 This type of directional vector assumes that an inefficient firm can decrease 
productive inefficiency while increasing desirable outputs and decreasing undesirable outputs 
and/or inputs in proportion to the initial combination of actual inputs and outputs. 
 One of the strong points of the WRDDM is that it is able to determine each variable’s 
contribution effect for inefficiency. This contribution effect cannot be determined in 
conventional productive inefficiency analysis. The contribution effects enable us to discuss 
how and why such firms successfully decreased their productive inefficiency. 
 
14 
 
4.2. TFP change decomposition and identification of innovator  
In order to analyze changes in efficiency over time, aggregated indices such as the Malmquist 
Index and Luenberger Productivity Indicator have been developed (Chambers, 1998). They 
are derived from the efficiency scores of production frontier models. These productivity 
indices are measures of total factor productivity, when the efficiency score comes from 
economic production frontier models. TFP includes all categories of productivity changes and 
can be decomposed further to provide a better understanding of the relative importance of 
various components, including Technical Change and Efficiency Change (Färe et al. 1994). 
Technical Change measures shifts in the production frontier, so-called frontier shift. 
Efficiency Change measures changes in the position of a production unit relative to the 
frontier, the so-called catching-up factor. 
 We employ the Luenberger Productivity Indicator as a TFP measure because the 
Luenberger Productivity Indicator is believed to be more robust than the widely used 
Malmquist Index (Chambers et al., 1998). Change in the Luenberger Productivity Indicator 
(TFP) is further broken down into technical change and efficiency change. TFP is computed 
with the results of the WRDDM and derived as follows: 
 
TFPt
t+1 =
1
2
{D⃗⃗ t+1(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑏𝑘
𝑡) − D⃗⃗ t+1(𝑥𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑏𝑘
𝑡+1) + D⃗⃗ t(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑏𝑘
𝑡) − D⃗⃗ t(𝑥𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑏𝑘
𝑡+1)}
 
(12) 
TECHCHt
t+1 =
1
2
{D⃗⃗ t+1(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑏𝑘
𝑡) + D⃗⃗ t+1(𝑥𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑏𝑘
𝑡+1) − D⃗⃗ t(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑏𝑘
𝑡) − D⃗⃗ t(𝑥𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑏𝑘
𝑡+1)} (13) 
EFFCHt
t+1 = D⃗⃗ t(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑏𝑘
𝑡) − D⃗⃗ t+1(𝑥𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑏𝑘
𝑡+1)
 
(14) 
TFPt
t+1 = TECHCHt
t+1 + EFFCHt
t+1
        
(15) 
 
 where 𝑥t  represents the input for year t, 𝑥t+1  is the input for year t+1, 𝑦t  is the 
desirable output for year t, and 𝑦t+1 is the desirable output for year t+1. 𝑏tis the undesirable 
output for year t, and 𝑏t+1  is the undesirable output for year t+1. D⃗⃗ 
t(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑏𝑘
𝑡) is the 
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inefficiency score of year t based on the frontier curve in year t. Similarly, D⃗⃗ t+1(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑏𝑘
𝑡) is 
the inefficiency of year t based on the frontier curve in year t+1.The TFP score indicates the 
productivity change as compared with the benchmark year. The TFP includes all categories 
of productivity change, which can be broken down into Technical Change (TECHCH) and 
Efficiency Change (EFFCH) as equation (15). 
 Here, we break down TFP using the inefficiency score of input, desirable output, and 
undesirable output variables’ contribution effect for inefficiency. The detailed breakdown of 
TFP is discussed in Appendix 1.  
 
TFPt
t+1 = TFPt,𝑥
t+1 + TFPt,y
t+1 + TFPt,b
t+1                 (16) 
TECHCHt
t+1 = TECHCHt,𝑥
t+1 + TECHCHt,y
t+1 + TECHCHt,b
t+1               (17) 
EFFCHt
t+1 = EFFCHt,𝑥
t+1 + EFFCHt,y
t+1 + EFFCHt,b
t+1                (18) 
 
TFPt,𝑥
t+1 represents a contribution effect of input variables for TFP change. TFPt,y
t+1 represents 
a contribution effect of desirable output variables for TFP change.TFPt,𝑏
t+1  represents a 
contribution effect of undesirable output variables for TFP change. 
 TECHCH for any particular firm only represents the shift in the production frontier 
from the viewpoint of that firm. A value of TECHCH does not necessarily imply which firm 
did actually shift the frontier line in a more desirable direction. Thus, in order to specify the 
firms that were shifting the frontier line, so-called “innovators” (see Färe et al., 1994), the 
following three conditions are required to be satisfied for a given firm. 
 By using the WRDDM result, we can distinguish the technological innovator from the 
three points of view, which are desirable output, undesirable output, and input. For example, 
technological innovator of input (x) and desirable output (y) needs to fulfil the following 
conditions. The technological innovator of input and desirable output (Innovatorx, y) achieves 
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more efficient input use and desirable output production from t year to t+1 year: In Appendix 
2, we explain how we identify the “innovator”. 
 Furthermore, the technological innovator of undesirable output reduces needs to fulfil 
the following conditions. The technological innovator of undesirable output performance 
(Innovatorb) achieves more efficient undesirable output management from t year to t+1 year. 
 
 
5. Data and empirical results 
 
5.1. Data  
 
The dataset used in this study was obtained from the Indian Banks’ Association and the 
Reserve Bank of India. The data comprises the inputs and outputs variables for the period 
2004 to 2011. All data were deflated to 2010 prices. We construct aggregate efficiency and 
bank productivity measures. Banks are assumed to produce three outputs: other earning assets, 
customer loans and bad loans by using three inputs: labour, deposits and premises. Table 1 
provides us with the statistical summary of our sample. 
 There are several approaches to modelling the bank production process. The standard 
methods are the intermediation and production approaches. Under the intermediation 
approach, banks use purchased funds together with physical inputs to produce various assets 
(measured by their value). According to the production approach, banks use only physical 
inputs, such as labour and capital, to produce deposits and various assets (measured by the 
number of deposit and loan accounts at a bank, or by the number of transactions for each 
product). We adopt the intermediation approach to model bank production and consider 
banks to be intermediaries of financial services that purchase input in order to generate 
earning assets (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest the 
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intermediation approach is best suited for evaluating bank efficiency, whereas the production 
approach is appropriate for evaluating the efficiency of bank branches. 
 
<Insert Table 1> 
 
 We present our results in two parts. First, we report results for bank inefficiency and 
its components. The second part then focuses on the detailed analysis of productivity growth 
and its drivers. 
 
5.2. Bank inefficiency 
We report results for technical efficiency using the assumption of a constant return to scale 
(CRS). We present the results in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 reveals the average inefficiency 
scores for individual inputs and outputs, including NPLs, and total technical inefficiency. We 
cannot confirm an improvement in bank efficiency over the examined period. We observe an 
abrupt increase in bank inefficiency after 2004 that continues until 2009, with an exception 
for 2007–2008. Then, bank inefficiency decreases to 58.8 and 57.5 per cent in 2010 and 2011 
respectively. 
 Furthermore, our methodological approach allows us to open the black-box and 
examine the individual drivers behind bank inefficiency. In Table 2, we report the 
inefficiency levels of individual inputs/outputs. We see that the inefficiency scores for 
employees and deposits are high in 2004 but that they gradually decrease over the examined 
period. The inefficiency score of employees’ contribution is 55 per cent in 2004 and reduces 
to only 9 per cent in 2011. This can be seen as a positive sign that indicates the successful 
implementation of bank restructuring policies. We obtain similar results for deposits. As for 
physical capital, the inefficiency levels remain low, which indicate that banks utilized their 
physical capital in more efficient ways. 
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On the other hand, the inefficiency levels of individual outputs are rather high. This is 
particularly evident for the categories of other earning assets (OEA) and NPLs. The 
contribution of NPLs to bank inefficiency is also quite volatile. The inefficiency levels of 
NPLs improved until 2010, but then the inefficiency level of NPLs increased by 25 
percentage points. This deterioration corresponds with the current situation in Indian banking, 
when NPLs become a problem particularly for SPBs. Our results further indicate that banks 
have a large scope for improvement by expanding their business activities in the segment of 
OEA. The estimated inefficiency levels for OEA remain very high. This might be improved 
by a further deregulation process that would allow banks to be involved also in other business 
activities apart from providing standard lending. 
 
<Insert Table 2> 
 
As we discuss in Section 2, there exist institutional and operational differences among 
Indian banks. To examine the differences in terms of their performance we divide banks into 
three groups according to their ownership structure: national banks, private domestic banks 
and foreign banks. Such a classification corresponds with the classification used by the 
Reserve Bank of India.  
Table 3 then displays the individual inefficiency levels across these three groups. The 
bank efficiency levels of SPBs do not improve until 2009 despite the expensive consolidation 
programme introduced by the government. However, bank inefficiency again declines in 
2011. In this year, the bank inefficiency score reaches the level of 66.9 per cent. This 
improvement corresponds with changes along with the individual levels of inputs/outputs 
inefficiencies. Inefficiency levels for deposits and employees on the average remain higher 
compared with private and foreign domestic banks. We further observe that the inefficiency 
19 
 
levels of individual inputs gradually decline over the period. This positive trend indicates that 
the applied restructuring and liberalization policies that enhanced competitiveness eventually 
improved bank efficiency.  
As for the second group, i.e. private domestic banks, we may see the similar trajectory 
of bank inefficiency levels. The inefficiency levels are lower compared to SPBs. This is even 
more striking in the foreign bank segment. The domestic bank group reports lower overall 
inefficiency levels that correspond with the inefficiency levels of individual inputs/outputs. 
We confirm that the ownership structure is an important determinant for bank performance.  
 As for the output inefficiency scores, the presented results convincingly confirm that 
the consolidation of banks’ balance sheets in terms of NPLs was successful across all Indian 
banks. The inefficiency levels of NPLs considerably decreased over the period from 2009 to 
2010. NPLs had only a marginal effect on bank inefficiency. However, the results for 2011 
show an increase in overall bank inefficiency levels. That is accompanied by an increase in 
NPL inefficiency. Such a trend may indicate continuing problems with loans quality. 
 
<Insert Table 3> 
 
 Next, we examine whether the average inefficiency scores are statistically different 
among the three analyzed bank groups. We apply the Kruskal-Wallis test that is a general 
alternative to the nonparametric method of two-sample t-test. Based on the results of the test 
we reject the null hypothesis of equal inefficiency across these three bank groups. In Table 4, 
the results show that inefficiency scores are statistically different across the bank groups. It is 
evident that, apart from fixed assets that are statistically significant at a 5 percent level, the 
remaining variables are strongly significant at a 1percent level. 
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<Insert Table 4> 
 
5.3. TFP growth 
Next, we analyze results for TFP growth. TFP changes are broken down into Technical 
Change (TECHCH) and Efficiency Change (EFFCH). TECHCH shows shifts in the 
production frontier, while EFFCH measures changes in the position of a production unit 
relative to the frontier. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the accumulative changes of TFP, TECHCH 
and EFFCH indicators from 2004 to 2011. We set 2004 as the baseline year (All indicators 
are zero in 2004). 
 A positive TFP shows that the Indian banking sector achieved technological progress 
over the entire analyzed period. The cumulative TFP growth is 29.6 percent, which  indicates 
an average growth of more than 4 percent. This is higher than the recently reported TFP in 
China by Chang et al. (2012), which show that the average TFP growth is 3.85 percent. In 
Figure 1, we report the individual drivers of TFP. We identify, in the first half of our analysis, 
that labour force savings and the use of fixed assets contribute to positive TFP changes. 
Deposits show a negative impact on TFP growth although at the marginal level of 0.01 per 
cent. As for outputs, the main factors behind the growth are NPLs and loans. However, we 
observe a different pattern from 2008, when NPLs have a negative impact on TFP. The 
standard decomposition of TFP into Technical Change (TECHCH) and Efficiency Change 
(EFFCH) provides a further insight into the factor behind TFP changes.  
 From Figure 2 we observe that the cumulative TECHCH growth changes by 11.9 
percent. Thus, Indian banks reports technological progress over the analyzed period. The 
main factors that shifted the production frontier are the use of deposits and labour costs that is 
reinforced by NPLs. Figure 3 shows the negative EFFCH during the period from 2004 to 
2009. This negative growth is caused primarily by OEA and loans. Thus, TFP growth is 
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driven until 2009 by positive TECHCH growth. After that, it is evident that the Indian banks 
are getting closer to the efficiency frontier. The particular drivers behind the positive impact 
on EFFCH are fixed assets, employees and the management of NPLs. However, as we see 
from Figures 2 and 3, the efficient management of NPLs did not offset the negative impact of 
NPLs on the TECHCH indicator. The effect of other earning assets on TFP growth reflects 
output expansion caused by shifts in the production frontier. However, other earning assets 
have a largely negative impact on EFFCH that is not fully offset by TECHCH. 
  
<Insert Figure 1> 
<Insert Figure 2> 
<Insert Figure 3> 
 
 Table 5 provides an overview of the average values of the disaggregated factors of 
TFP, TECHCH and EFFCH for all three bank groups. As we see SPBs and domestic private 
banks show the positive TFP change. The foreign banks then report negative TFP growth. A 
further break down provides the detailed contribution of the individual factor to TFP growth 
and TECHCH and EFFCH indicators among the analyzed groups. 
 As for TFP growth, it is surprising that foreign banks over the analyzed period show 
productivity regress compared to SPBs and private domestic banks. We see that NPLs have a 
negative impact on TFP growth in the private and foreign bank segments. This result 
represents a treatment of NPLs that is more inefficient in 2011 compared to 2004. 
Additionally, NPLs negatively affect the TECHCH indicator for foreign banks. Thus, the 
productive frontier line is shifted more undesirable direction due to bad NPL treatment by 
foreign banks. 
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<Insert Table 5> 
 
 Finally, we introduce in our study the concept of firm “innovator” (Fare et al. 1994) 
that allows us to identify those banks that shift the production frontier. Table 6 identifies 
innovator banks over the analyzed period. As we can see, the technical progress of foreign 
banks acts as a driver that pushes production frontiers in the Indian bank sector. We can also 
confirm that foreign banks satisfy the condition of being innovators for both, i.e., input and 
output use, and NPL treatment. However, there is no shift to more desirable direction in the 
production frontier by foreign banks after 2009. Instead national and domestic banks take 
over the lead. 
 
<Insert Table 6> 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes recent changes in bank efficiency and productivity growth in the Indian 
banking sector. The study contributes to ongoing empirical research on Indian banking see, 
for example, Das and Kumbhakar (2012), Casu et al. (2012), Tabak and Tecles (2010), 
among others. In addition, we apply an innovative methodological approach that extends 
recent research studies on bank efficiency and productivity, which includes Barros et al. 
(2012), Chang et al. (2012), Fukuyama and Sekitani (2012). We measure the effect of 
individual inputs and outputs to the overall bank performances and estimate the individual 
drivers of productivity growth. We also introduce the so-called “innovator” based on Färe et 
al. 1994. This is a new feature in studies on bank efficiency and productivity  
We may summarize our results and contributions as follows. We find that the 
inefficiency levels are significantly different among the three ownership structures of Indian 
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banks. We show that foreign banks have strong market competitiveness in India and they pull 
the production frontier in a more efficient direction. SPBs and domestic private banks show 
considerably higher inefficiency. The disaggregated bank inputs and outputs identify that, in 
particular, management of labour forces, other earning assets, and NPLs are the main factors 
contributing to bank inefficiency. Although our results suggest employee management in 
SPBs and domestic private banks has been improving more rapidly than in foreign banks. 
Furthermore, our results indicate that the Indian banking sector as a whole diverges to higher 
technical efficiency in 2011 but we cannot confirm if this is an occasional event or trend. 
Therefore, further examination is needed to confirm it.  
The strong position of foreign banks in our findings contradicts earlier studies that 
used the data sample only for the 1990s and early 2000s (Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003), Das 
and Ghosh (2006), Sanyal and Shankar (2011)). The previous research suggests that SPBs 
and private domestic banks operate more efficiently than foreign banks. Our results, however, 
indicate that SPBs failed to take advantage of the consolidation and restructuralization 
process that was strongly supported by the Indian government in the late 1990s. We argue 
that the improvement of SPBs in the 1990s and the early 2000s was rather temporary and 
SPBs now face again the problem of deteriorating balance sheets and poor management 
compared with established foreign banks. Casu et al’s 2012 paper that uses a  more recent 
dataset corresponds with our findings.  
If we analyze productivity growth of the Indian banks we find that TFP growth has 
not improved significantly over the period from 2004 to 2011. The disaggregation of TFP 
into TECHCH and EFFCH shows that the production frontier actually shifted down from 
2008. These results are consistent with Casu et al. (2013) who also find that the technological 
frontier shift is mainly caused by the performance improvement in the foreign bank group. 
Kumbhakar and Sakar (2003) pointed out that TFP growth was rather moderate in the 1990s 
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and the sector showed signs of over-employment. Similar conclusions are presented again by 
Das and Kumbhakar (2012), who argue that Indian labour market inflexibility is a typical 
barrier to reform. We show that this issue has been partially resolved in the SPB segment in 
the second half of the 2000s.  
 The results presented unambiguously indicate that policy-makers and regulators need 
to address the continuing problems of mounting NPLs. We show that NPLs cause 
technological regress and this issue has to be addressed by Indian Banks. This result is most 
probably due to the traditional problems that still face Indian banks and affect their efficiency 
and productivity, which include factors such as the high percentage of NPLs, poor 
restructuring, management failings and the lack of market power.  
We conclude that the restructuring policy applied in the late 1990s and early 2000s by 
the Indian government has not had a long-lasting effect in terms of improved efficiency and 
TFP growth, particularly in the SPB segment and further steps have to be taken by policy-
makers in order to fully restore the Indian banking system. Our findings support the recent 
analysis published by Herd et al. (2011). 
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Table1 
Data description 
year Fix Asset Deposits Employee Loans OEA NPL 
2004 4,028 255,651 13,027 146,230 14,284 4,224 
2005 4,308 298,063 13,260 199,032 14,895 3,520 
2006 4,699 365,206 13,826 265,151 18,986 2,813 
2007 5,667 459,623 14,358 331,043 24,051 3,175 
2008 8,320 553,529 15,071 406,952 33,055 3,573 
2009 9,097 661,250 15,294 488,028 45,772 4,692 
2010 9,179 783,216 15,516 561,364 36,603 5,834 
2011 10,155 102,018 16,389 707,869 46,842 6,023 
 
 
Table 2 
Average inefficiency score by variable from 2004 to 2011 
   Fix Asset Deposit Employee Loan OEA NPL Inefficiency 
2004 
Average 0.049 0.306 0.552 0.030 1.858 0.598 0.615 
Std. (0.141) (0.201) (0.341) (0.091) (1.691) (0.345) (0.390) 
2005 
Average 0.127 0.148 0.387 0.715 3.322 0.539 0.926 
Std. (0.220) (0.169) (0.265) (0.592) (2.597) (0.341) (0.588) 
2006 
Average 0.157 0.104 0.354 0.627 3.187 0.687 0.933 
Std. (0.230) (0.141) (0.230) (0.416) (2.336) (0.322) (0.520) 
2007 
Average 0.007 0.144 0.425 0.148 2.890 0.558 0.757 
Std. (0.030) (0.156) (0.225) (0.247) (2.771) (0.317) (0.509) 
2008 
Average 0.015 0.090 0.324 0.016 4.603 0.168 0.874 
Std. (0.065) (0.117) (0.279) (0.063) (4.198) (0.216) (0.720) 
2009 
Average 0.014 0.012 0.215 0.001 5.343 0.031 0.928 
Std. (0.065) (0.032) (0.218) (0.007) (5.164) (0.091) (0.874) 
2010 
Average 0.019 0.016 0.222 0.000 3.248 0.054 0.588 
Std. (0.074) (0.035) (0.232) (0.000) (3.250) (0.136) (0.563) 
2011 
Average 0.026 0.189 0.091 0.017 2.617 0.305 0.575 
Std. (0.105) (0.285) (0.133) (0.070) (2.340) (0.306) (0.456) 
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Table 3 
Average inefficiency score by variables and three groups 
  year Fix Asset Deposit Employee Loan OEA NPL Inefficiency 
National 
bank 
2004 0.000 0.385 0.692 0.026 1.646 0.611 0.602 
2005 0.055 0.185 0.501 0.801 3.384 0.541 0.960 
2006 0.086 0.144 0.472 0.668 3.634 0.748 1.044 
2007 0.000 0.211 0.539 0.146 3.792 0.673 0.964 
2008 0.022 0.079 0.323 0.003 6.384 0.145 1.160 
2009 0.032 0.001 0.178 0.000 6.823 0.004 1.162 
2010 0.012 0.020 0.222 0.000 4.930 0.053 0.868 
2011 0.008 0.076 0.025 0.014 3.059 0.435 0.669 
Private 
bank 
2004 0.088 0.299 0.573 0.041 2.361 0.694 0.738 
2005 0.206 0.141 0.395 0.818 4.266 0.650 1.146 
2006 0.242 0.083 0.346 0.721 3.710 0.788 1.076 
2007 0.017 0.123 0.444 0.197 2.891 0.618 0.785 
2008 0.013 0.119 0.406 0.034 4.189 0.211 0.834 
2009 0.000 0.027 0.318 0.003 5.532 0.068 0.983 
2010 0.032 0.017 0.270 0.000 2.400 0.072 0.460 
2011 0.052 0.269 0.181 0.026 2.815 0.217 0.602 
Foreign 
bank 
2004 0.081 0.074 0.036 0.008 0.930 0.246 0.260 
2005 0.107 0.050 0.000 0.113 0.108 0.180 0.114 
2006 0.116 0.040 0.000 0.192 0.084 0.167 0.119 
2007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2008 0.000 0.033 0.066 0.000 0.224 0.105 0.083 
2009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2010 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.575 0.000 0.104 
2011 0.000 0.295 0.020 0.000 0.569 0.170 0.187 
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Table 4 
Difference of inefficiency among bank group 
  
 National  Private  Foreign 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
  χ2 sig 
Fix Asset 0.027 0.081 0.038 8.62 ** 
Deposit 0.138 0.135 0.062 13.77 *** 
Employee 0.369 0.366 0.024 57.68 *** 
Loan 0.207 0.230 0.039 10.54 *** 
OEA 4.207 3.520 0.311 63.73 *** 
NPL 0.401 0.415 0.109 26.33 *** 
Inefficiency 0.929 0.828 0.108 65.58 *** 
**, *** represent 5% and 1% significant level 
 
Table 5 
Difference of productivity change indicators from 2004 to 2011 among bank group 
    National Private Foreign χ2 sig 
TFP 
Fix Asset -0.023 0.009 0.004 3.08  
Deposit 0.057 0.031 0.035 0.54  
Employee 0.080 0.071 0.021 13.59 *** 
Loan 0.095 0.055 0.019 7.98 ** 
OEA 0.331 0.476 0.076 1.62  
NPL 0.010 -0.022 -0.149 0.33  
total 0.087 0.093 -0.027 1.71   
TECHCH 
Fix Asset -0.022 0.003 -0.008 1.41  
Deposit 0.013 0.026 0.067 2.24  
Employee -0.015 0.015 0.019 2.36  
Loan 0.093 0.053 0.018 0.59  
OEA 0.532 0.540 0.024 1.08  
NPL -0.015 -0.09 -0.159 3.66  
Total 0.097 0.074 -0.037 0.85   
EFFCH 
Fix Asset -0.001 0.005 0.012 0.19  
Deposit 0.044 0.004 -0.032 3.60  
Employee 0.095 0.056 0.002 10.09 *** 
Loan 0.002 0.002 0.001 1.65  
OEA -0.202 -0.065 0.052 0.03  
NPL 0.025 0.068 0.011 1.42  
total -0.010 0.019 0.010 0.02  
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Table 6 
 Innovators by bank groups 
  All banks 
(N=37) 
National banks 
(N=16) 
Private banks 
 (N=16) 
Foreign banks 
 (N=5) 
Innovator of 
total factor 
productivity 
(Innovator) 
2004-2005 1 0 0 1 
2005-2006 2 0 0 2 
2006-2007 3 0 0 3 
2007-2008 3 0 0 3 
2008-2009 2 1 0 1 
2009-2010 2 1 1 0 
2010-2011 0 0 0 0 
Innovator of 
input and 
goods use 
(Innovatorx, y) 
2004-2005 0 0 0 0 
2005-2006 1 0 0 1 
2006-2007 2 0 0 2 
2007-2008 4 0 0 4 
2008-2009 2 1 0 1 
2009-2010 1 1 0 0 
2010-2011 0 0 0 0 
Innovator of 
NPLs 
treatment 
(Innovatorb) 
2004-2005 2 1 0 1 
2005-2006 2 0 0 2 
2006-2007 1 0 0 1 
2007-2008 0 0 0 0 
2008-2009 2 1 0 1 
2009-2010 2 0 1 1 
2010-2011 0 0 0 0 
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Figure 1 
TFP change from 2004 to 2011 by each input/output variable
 
 
Figure 2  
TECHCH change from 2004 to 2011 by each input/output variables 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Asset Deposit Employee Loan Other NNPL TFP
TFP
Year
-0.40
-0.30
-0.20
-0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Asset Deposit Employee Loan Other NNPL TECHCH
TECHCH
Year
33 
 
Figure 3 
EFFCH change from 2004 to 2011 by each input/output variables 
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